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Upon first glance, Lee Blomquist’s drug offense convictions and denial on 
appeal appears to be a run-of-the-mill consent exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s search warrant requirement.1 A closer look, however, reveals 
three key issues: Did Blomquist consent to the search of his marijuana 
operation? Why did the federal government, and not the state government, 
charge him? Was the entire point of Michigan’s social equity program frustrated 
by the federal government’s actions? Blomquist’s deceptively simple consent 
exception case demonstrates the tension between the federal government’s 
resistance to legalizing medical marijuana and states’ efforts, including social 
equity programs, to encourage medical marijuana businesses. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Lee Blomquist pled guilty and was convicted of the federal crimes of 
distributing and conspiring to distribute marijuana, as well as manufacturing and 
possessing with intent to distribute between 50–100 marijuana plants at trial in 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan.2  He then appealed 
his convictions to the Sixth Circuit, “arguing that the police exceeded the scope 
of their search warrant.”3 
Blomquist’s legal troubles began with the KIND county drug enforcement 
team arriving at his father’s property.4 Upon arrival, the officers detained 
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Blomquist, handcuffed him, and read him his Miranda rights.5 Blomquist 
waived his rights, was apparently cooperative enough that the police removed 
the handcuffs at some point, and gave the police an extensive tour of his 
marijuana production and processing operation.6 He first showed the officers 
his binder containing paperwork that he believed demonstrated that he was 
running a legal operation.7 
It is quite possible that Blomquist could have been operating a legal medical 
marijuana business. Michigan’s Medical Marihuana Act acknowledges the 
beneficial uses of medical marijuana and allows for ways for residents to 
produce, distribute, and consume it.8 From the Act, the Michigan Marijuana 
Regulatory Agency developed a new social equity program, the purpose of 
which was to “promote and encourage participation in the marijuana industry 
by people from communities that have been disproportionately impacted by 
marijuana prohibition and enforcement and to positively impact those 
communities.”9 This program helps participation in the medical marijuana 
industry through a variety of ways, including a twenty-five percent fee reduction 
for adult use licensing fees for residents in a disproportionately impacted 
community, and a twenty-five to forty percent fee reduction for individuals with 
marijuana convictions.10  
Assuming that Blomquist was indeed conducting a legal medical marijuana 
business, could he truly give consent?11 It is doubtful that he understood that the 
officers were conducting a Fourth Amendment search to gather evidence against 
him, and that was what he consented to. Because Blomquist believed his 
operation was legal, it seems rather unlikely that he consented.12  
After first showing the officers his binder that contained paperwork he 
thought demonstrated that he was running a legal operation, Blomquist began 
to lead the officers around several properties.13 Upon the officers’ request, but 
of his own volition, he showed them the five small rooms in the chicken coop 
where he grew the marijuana.14 Blomquist explained he usually moved the 
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Blomquist, Nos. 19-2111/21121-2, at 2–3. 
 12 Id. at 2. 
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marijuana to greenhouses in warmer weather and proceeded to show the officers 
those buildings.15 The officers then asked where he stored the processed 
marijuana, so he led them to the garage on his father’s property, brought down 
the attic ladder, and led them up to a locked room within the attic.16 This room 
contained approximately thirty-seven pounds of pre-packaged marijuana.17 
Throughout the tour, there were apparently no physical indicators or 
explanations from Blomquist that the operation spanned several properties, and 
the record is unclear about when, or even if, the officers announced the existence 
of their search warrant. Additionally, it is uncertain where on the properties 
Blomquist was handcuffed or where they were removed.18  
II. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND CONSENT – BLOMQUIST DID NOT CONSENT. 
On appeal, Blomquist argued that the search was invalid because he did not 
give consent, the search exceeded the warrant, and that any consent he may have 
given was tainted as a result.19 The court stated that valid consent is free and 
voluntary, and that the government must additionally show that the consent 
“was voluntary, unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated 
by duress or coercion.”20 The Sixth Circuit also evaluated whether Blomquist 
gave consent by looking at the totality of the circumstances of the search.21 
Blomquist’s consent was viewed as uncontaminated by looking at the totality of 
the circumstances, including factors such as “the age, intelligence, and 
education of the individual; whether the individual understands the right to 
refuse to consent; whether the individual understands his or her constitutional 
rights; the length and nature of detention; and the use of coercive or punishing 
conduct by the police.”22 There was no indication to the Sixth Circuit that 
Blomquist “was uniquely susceptible to duress or coercion.”23 He was forty-six 
years old at the time of arrest, had earned his high-school diploma, was trained 
as an electrician, and the district court described him as “a very intelligent 
individual.”24 Additionally, his extensive criminal history, including a 2002 
arrest for growing more than one hundred marijuana plants on the same 
property, indicated to the court that he was well-versed with police and the legal 
system, and therefore was not under duress or coerced.25  
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Blomquist, Nos. 19-2111/21121-2, at 2.  
 18 Id. at 2, 6. 
 19 Id. at 5–6.  
 20 Id. at 4. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Blomquist, Nos. 19-2111/21121-2, at 4–5. 
 23 Id. at 5. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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Furthermore, the detention of Blomquist was brief, during which he heard 
and waived his Miranda rights, indicating that he was “fully aware that anything 
he shared with the officers could be used against him.”26 He then proceeded to 
share his entire growing operation with the officers.27 While the officers did ask 
to see particular areas, they were not threatening, nor did they mistreat 
Blomquist in order to force him to take them to the requested sites.28 The Sixth 
Circuit also considered Blomquist’s full cooperation from the “get-go” as a 
factor that weighed on the side of uncontaminated consent.29  
Blomquist attempted to counter the appellate court’s finding that the consent 
exception applied by asserting that his consent was contaminated because of 
various issues relating to the search warrant.30 First, because he was detained 
and there was the presence of a tactical law enforcement unit, his consent was 
therefore “tainted.”31 The Sixth Circuit reiterated that based on the totality of 
circumstances, these “factors do not appear to have influenced [Blomquist’s] 
actions in any significant manner.”32 Second, he argued that the existence of the 
warrant coerced him into showing the officers his full operation and that because 
the scope of the warrant was violated, his consent was tainted.33 The Sixth 
Circuit points out that the trial record does not show when, or even if, the 
officers ever announced the existence of the search warrant before Blomquist 
started his tour.34 Blomquist even conceded in his appellate brief that he was 
“willing [to] and wanted to take [the police] to [the chicken coop].”35 These facts 
together show that he was not coerced by the warrant. Furthermore, the Sixth 
Circuit highlighted that the record was unclear as to where Blomquist was 
detained, and even if he was detained on his cousin’s property, “exceeding the 
scope of a search warrant does not automatically render consent non-
voluntary.”36 Id.  
Although the court claimed to look at the totality of the circumstances, it 
did not accord proper weight to the fact that Blomquist thought his operation 
was legal. It is arguable that from Blomquist’s perspective, he was only giving 
a tour, and the cops were only asking questions. The consent tests require that 
consent be voluntary and intelligently given.37 How can someone intelligently 
give consent to a search if they do not even know that it is a search? The police 
arrived in full tactical gear, but then they removed his handcuffs, accepted his 
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 36 Id. 
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binder of paperwork, and simply asked to see the operation.38 Furthermore, the 
record does not establish when, or even if, the officers showed Blomquist their 
search warrant, furthering the impression of a tour, not a search.39 The court 
used his cooperation to establish voluntariness, and therefore consent, but it 
seems unlikely that Blomquist was consenting to a Fourth Amendment search 
as he believed there was nothing illegal to search.40 
III. ASSUMING CONSENT—THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT 
HAVE HANDLED BLOMQUIST’S CASE 
Let us assume, for argument’s sake, that there was consent. This case 
presents an even more interesting issue: which state medical marijuana law did 
Blomquist actually violate? His conviction rested solely on federal crimes, but 
on appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that Blomquist had also broken state laws.41 
However, if he did break state law, he should have been indicted by the state of 
Michigan, not the federal government.  
The Sixth Circuit stated that Blomquist’s operation was not even legal under 
Michigan law because he had a federal felony drug record and cited to Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 333.26423(k) (2016) for support.42 The subsection the court cited 
to is the definition section of Michigan’s Medical Marihuana Act, which states 
that a “‘primary caregiver’ or ‘caregiver’ means a person . . . who has agreed to 
assist with a patient's medical use of marihuana and who has not been convicted 
of any felony within the past 10 years and has never been convicted of a felony 
involving illegal drugs . . . .”43 However, the court does not establish that 
Blomquist was considered a “caregiver”; in fact, in the very next sentence, it 
classifies Blomquist as a distributor.44 So which category does Blomquist fall 
into? The distinction is critical, as distributors are subject to very different 
stipulations than caregivers, regarding both previous convictions and quantities 
of marijuana.45 Unfortunately, the Sixth Circuit did not make this distinction 
clear.  
Blomquist, if a distributor, was not prohibited by a prior felony drug 
conviction from running a medical marijuana operation.46 That conviction 
instead qualified him to participate in Michigan’s social equity program, since 
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it was marijuana related.47 However, if Blomquist was a caregiver, any type of 
felony would preclude him from qualifying as a legal caregiver.48 
The court also stated that his operation was too large to be legal as a 
distributor and that Blomquist sold marijuana to a person without a medical 
marijuana card.49 However, the court did not cite to any Michigan law or 
Marijuana Regulatory Agency regulation to support the claim that Blomquist’s 
operation was too large. Nor did the court focus in on the fact that the person 
Blomquist sold marijuana to was also from Wisconsin—which is how the 
federal government could charge Blomquist for these federal crimes.50  
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court held that regardless of state laws 
allowing the use of marijuana for medical purposes, Congress still retained 
authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to 
“prohibit local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California 
law.”51 Even though Blomquist was allegedly running a Michigan medical 
marijuana operation and violating state law, because he sold his marijuana to a 
man from Wisconsin, the Commerce clause was triggered, and the federal 
government had jurisdiction to prosecute him. Despite this, it does not seem 
prudent for this case to be handled by the federal government. 
Regardless of how Blomquist violated the social equity program, his 
indiscretions were not addressed at the state level. As the Michigan Marihuana 
Act states, “approximately 99 out of every 100 marihuana arrests in the United 
States are made under state law, rather than under federal law,” which indicates 
a good reason for dealing with cases like Blomquist’s at the state level.52 
Blomquist’s case does not seem so egregious that it should be the one out of one 
hundred cases handled by the federal government. In fact, it is similar to a case 
that the State of Michigan handled. 
In People v. Hartwick, the defendant, Richard Lee Hartwick, was charged 
with possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and manufacturing twenty to 
two hundred marijuana plants.53 County police officers received a tip 
concerning a marijuana growing operation in Hartwick’s house.54 When they 
 
 47 Id. Indeed, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Michigan released 
a memo stating that Blomquist was convicted in 2003 for manufacturing marijuana. The 
memo also indicates that Blomquist had a felon in possession of a firearm conviction but 
does not specify whether that was a result of the drug conviction or if it happened previously. 
Felch Man. 
 48 Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, § 26423(k). 
 49 Blomquist, Nos. 19-2111/21121-2, at 2–3. 
 50 Felch Man.  
 51 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. ___ at 1 (2005) [https://perma.cc/936R-8HQS]. The 
Commerce Clause is the colloquial name for the part of Section 8 that states Congress can 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. Id. 
 52 Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, § 26422. 
 53 People v. Hartwick, Nos. 148444/148971, at 8 (Mich. July 27, 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/ZNB3-SBTQ]. Hartwick’s case was combined with the case of People v. 
Tuttle, No. 148971. 
 54 Id. at 7. 
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arrived and confronted Hartwick, he claimed he was in compliance with 
Michigan’s Medical Marijuana Act, and he consented to a search of his house.55 
Hartwick showed the officers his operation: between seventy-one and seventy-
seven marijuana plants at various stages of growth, as well as consumable 
marijuana.56 
Hartwick was charged by the county prosecutor and contested it, claiming 
the immunity and affirmative defenses under the Medical Marihuana Act.57 The 
immunity defense derives from Section 4 of the Act, which provides that 
qualifying patients and primary caregivers are each not subject to arrest or 
prosecution if compliant with limitations on quantities of marijuana and registry 
identification cards.58 The affirmative defense derives from Section 8 of the Act, 
which provides that a patient and the patient’s primary caregiver can assert the 
defense of marijuana use for medical purposes. The defense is allowed if they 
have a bona fide relationship with a physician that determined marijuana is 
likely to help their condition and the quantity of marijuana possessed is 
reasonable in relation to their condition.59 
Hartwick’s case, which was similar to Blomquist’s situation, was aptly 
handled by the State of Michigan’s court system. The trial court analyzed 
Hartwick’s Section 4 and Section 8 claims, based on the evidence he produced 
and the language of the statute, and concluded that he was not entitled to either 
defense.60 Hartwick appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which affirmed 
the lower court’s decision.61 Upon reaching the Supreme Court of Michigan, 
Hartwick’s case was used as an opportunity for the court to analyze Section 4 
and 8 and provide clear interpretations for future use.62 The court outlined 
eleven guidelines for applying Section 4 and three for Section 8.63 Hartwick’s 
claim under Section 4 was remanded to the lower court, and he lost under 
Section 8.64 The State of Michigan is clearly able to handle cases such as 
Blomquist’s, as demonstrated by Hartwick appealing his case up to the Supreme 
Court, and the courts’ detailed analysis of the Medical Marijuana Act.  
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS FRUSTRATING MICHIGAN’S SOCIAL 
EQUITY PROGRAM 
It simply does not make sense why the federal government would go after 
Blomquist, an individual selling marijuana to a single out-of-state individual. 
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 56 Id. at 8. 
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 58 Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, § 26424. 
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Michigan’s social equity program’s very purpose is to incentivize affected 
individuals to lawfully participate in the medical marijuana field. The federal 
government’s actions in this case seem to frustrate the very purpose of that 
program by punishing Blomquist instead of allowing the state to handle his 
infraction. Beyond the Medical Marijuana Act providing defenses against 
prosecution for medical marijuana, the Michigan Marijuana Regulatory Agency 
provides detailed consequences for violations of the program.65 Rules 420.801–
808 provide definitions, requirements for notifications and reporting, changes 
to licensed marijuana business’, notifications of diversion, theft, loss, or 
criminal activity, persons subject to penalties, violations, what the penalties are, 
agency warnings, and formal complaints.66 Within these very specific sections, 
the regulations provide the agency with a variety of responses to violations, 
including warnings, citations, formal complaints, and penalties.67 Adding 
another felonious marijuana conviction to Blomquist’s record simply adds to 
the problem that Michigan is trying to address, especially when Blomquist could 
have been adequately punished under state law had he been found to have 
committed any infractions. 
The tension-filled relationship between federal and state authorities with 
regard to the legalization of medical marijuana, as demonstrated by Mr. 
Blomquist’s situation, does not appear to be improving any time soon. Gonzales 
was decided in 2005, and since then, at least 20 states have legalized medical 
marijuana.68 Blomquist’s case was decided in 2020.69 It is disappointing, 
although not inconsistent, that federal authorities are still interfering with state 
social equity programs. What appeared to be a cut and dry consent exception to 
the Fourth Amendment search warrant requirement in a little over six-page 
opinion of the Sixth Circuit led to several important issues: it does not appear 
that Blomquist truly consented to a search, as he likely did not know it was a 
search, the federal government should not have handled his case, and by doing 
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